An algorithm is described that constructs, in a polynomial time, a Nash equilibrium in a finite game with additive aggregation and decreasing best responses. MSC2010 Classifications: 91A10; 91A04.
Introduction
In games with increasing best responses ("strategic complements"), the existence of a Nash equilibrium can be easily derived [12] from Tarski's fixed point theorem [11] . Moreover, an equilibrium in a finite game can be found, by Algorithms I or II of [12] , in a polynomial time (w.r.t. the number of players and the maximal number of strategies of one player).
In a game with decreasing best responses ("strategic substitutes"), there may be no equilibrium at all, the straightforward analog of Tarski's theorem for decreasing mappings being plainly wrong. Nonetheless, Novshek [10] showed that this property of the best responses ensures the existence of an equilibrium in the Cournot oligopoly model [2] . Although he worked with a continuous model and argued by continuity, the key role was played by a purely discrete trick. The fact was shown in [6] , where an algorithm constructing a Nash equilibrium in every finite game with integer strategies, additive aggregation, and decreasing best responses was explicitly defined. Unfortunately, the necessity to scan virtually the whole set of strategy profiles could not be excluded, hence the time taken could only be estimated as an exponential.
The objective of this paper is to present a modification of the algorithm of [6] that is guaranteed to find a Nash equilibrium in a polynomial time.
Quite recently, Bashlaeva and Lebedev [1] described an algorithm that checks the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite game with additive aggregation in a polynomial time, and produces one if it exists. However, that algorithm, being of a dynamic programming type, demands huge memory. Here, we just move through the set of strategy profiles, the next profile at each step being determined by the current one, without any need to remember the history.
Fixed-point framework
We start in a fixed-point framework, essentially the same as in [6, Proposition 1] . There is a finite set N (of players); for each i ∈ N , there is a set
Assuming each R i decreasing in the sense that
and s ′ i > s i , we describe an algorithm that constructs a fixed point, thereby proving its existence.
We set T := ∑ i∈N X i = {0, . . . ,m}, wherem := ∑ i∈N m i , and extend each R i to a mapping
For every i ∈ N and t ∈ T , we define
Then we assume the set N linearly ordered, say, N = {1, . . . , n}, and consider T × N with the lexicographic order where the t-component matters first, so (0, 1) is the minimum, followed by (0, 2), etc., while (m, n) is the maximum. We define
We define a mapping ξ N from (a subset of) C * to X N , i.e., a sequence of strategy profiles indexed by pairs (t, i), by backward recursion. First, we set ξ j ( * ) := 0 for all j ∈ N . Then we apply a uniform procedure ensuring the following properties whenever ξ N (t, i) is defined:
Having ξ N ((t, i) ′ ) already defined, we set
If Q i (t) = ∅, the process stops with a diagnosis "failure." Otherwise, we define ξ j (t, i) := ξ j ((t, i) ′ ) for all j ̸ = i and ξ i (t, i) := max Q i (t); conditions (1) are easy to check. If ∑ j∈N ξ j (t, i) = t, the process stops with a diagnosis "success"; otherwise, we move further.
Theorem. The process just described ends at some stage (t + , i + ) with a diagnosis "success," and ξ N (t
Proof. To start with, 0 ∈ Q i (m) ̸ = ∅ for each i ∈ N , so a failure could only happen when t <m.
Claim 1. If ξ N (t, i) is defined and
Proof of Claim 1. We denote
as well, we are home. Supposing the contrary, we must have
, which contradicts the choice of ξ i (τ, i).
Proof of Claim 2. The assumptions of Claim 1 hold for (t + 1, i),
Note that if ξ N (0, n) is defined, then conditions (1b) and (1c) immediately imply that ξ i (0, n) = 0 for each i ∈ N , which means a success. Thus, Claim 2 implies that our process cannot end in failure. Since C * is finite, it must end; therefore, it ends with success.
Claim 3. If the process stops at (t
+ , i + ) with a diagnosis "success," then ξ N (t + , i + ) is a fixed point.
Proof of Claim 3. It is obviously sufficient to prove that
+ , this immediately follows from the description of the process. For i < i + , we have ξ i (t + , i + ) ∈ B i (t + + 1) from the same description; then we invoke Claim 1.
The theorem is proven.
Denoting m := max i∈N m i , we see that #C
} is scanned to determine which strategies belong to Q i (t). Altogether, the algorithm requires no more than O(m 2 n 2 ) "elementary" steps.
Remark. The number of steps required in [1] is bounded above by O(m 3 n 3 ).
Strategic games
Let Γ be a strategic game with a finite set N of players and strategy sets X i = {0, . . . , m i } for each i ∈ N ; let the utility functions of the players be
The constructions from the previous section apply whenever each R i is decreasing. The only difference is that we no longer can view checking whether x i ∈ R i (s i ) as an elementary operation. However, such a check requires no more than m i comparisons of utilities, hence our algorithm remains polynomial, with time taken not exceeding O(m 3 n 2 ). If there are no a priori grounds to believe that the best responses are decreasing, we can invoke well-known sufficient conditions: strictly decreasing differences (Topkis [12] ),
or, more generally, strict single crossing (Milgrom and Shannon [9] ),
The verification of either condition can be done in a polynomial time. In both cases, we may restrict ourselves to s (2) or (3), we can just run the algorithm. If the process ends successfully, we have a Nash equilibrium; if it ends in failure, we, at least, know that the best responses are not decreasing.
Remark. Instead of checking conditions
If each X i is an arbitrary finite set of integers, a straightforward modification of our constructions is needed, cf. [6, Proposition 2] ; the algorithm remains polynomial w.r.t. the number of players and the maximal "range" of a strategy set, max X i − min X i .
If each X i is an arbitrary finite set of real numbers, the existence of a Nash equilibrium still holds because we can approximate the game with an integer one; however, the algorithm can hardly be called polynomial in any reasonable sense. By [7, Theorem 2] , a Nash equilibrium will be reached in a finite number of steps if we iterate the best responses starting from any strategy profile. Unfortunately, the number of steps needed admits no polynomial estimate.
Remark. The sequence ξ N (t, i) in the above proof is not generated by iteration of the best responses.
A completely unrelated trick invented by Huang [4] for studying fictitious play was made applicable to best response dynamics in [3] . Further development [8, 5] showed that additive aggregation can be replaced with, e.g., general linear one, (3) holds, then a Nash equilibrium exists and is reached from any strategy profile, in a finite number of steps, by iterations of the best responses. Unfortunately, the number of steps needed again admits no polynomial estimate, and there is no analog of Novshek's trick in this, more general, situation.
Remark.
Since there are no restrictions on the signs of a ij , the best responses here may be increasing in some players' strategies and decreasing in others'.
Finally, let us return to games with strategic complements. Both Algorithms I and II of [12] produce increasing sequences in each player's strategy set; therefore, the total number of steps cannot exceed mn. Adding the comparisons of utilities, we obtain O(m 2 n 2 ). It should be stressed that there is no need for any aggregation in the utilities and that the strategy sets may be arbitrary finite lattices. Although the standard sufficient conditions for increasing best responses, similar to (2) or (3), apparently cannot be verified in polynomial time in the general case, we can run either algorithm anyway and, as above, either find an equilibrium, or learn that the best responses are not increasing.
